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Abstract 
This study is about how the Swedish military handles their identity in regards to a post-Cold 
War world both in the formal and informal sense. In the study we ask how the two identities 
of the Swedish military are constructed are and if they are compatible. We also discuss what 
consequences may come from the two identities. As analytical tool we used Critical Discourse 
Analysis combined with a framework by Lene Hansen combined with Cold War and post-
Cold War security logics. We find that there is two incompatible identities struggling in the 
eye of the public and that there can be problematic consequences from this struggle between 
identities.  
Keywords: Swedish military, Lene Hansen, Speech act, Post-Cold War Security logic, Cold 
War security logic, Critical Discourse Analysis, Securitization, Political Science 
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1. Swedish defense – a case of unresolved identities 
The overarching question for this study is how the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) handles the issue of 
its own identity in the post-Cold War world considering the statement by commander in Chief (ciC) 
Sverker Göranson in Svenska Dagbladet (SvD). In this interview Sverker Göranson positions himself 
in a Cold War security logic, in contrast with the official post-Cold War security logic of the PR-
campaigns of later years. 
During the Cold War Sweden maintained a policy of neutrality in peace time to be able to stay neutral 
in case of hostility between the two military blocs North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
Warsaw Pact (WP). This led to a development of a stable identity for the SAF and a large army and 
with a large weapons industry that developed its own weapons system independent of the two military 
blocs, even though it was clear that, in case of war SAF would side with NATO and the “West”.1 The 
identity and purpose was clear for the military, they were to fight against an expected mass invasion, 
so in other words Sweden had a non-flexible defense against an imagined mass invasion during the 
Cold War. When the end of the Cold War came and the Soviet Union disintegrated the traditionally 
imagined enemy had gone and the SAF stood without a clear enemy or identity. This was also true for 
most of Western Europe, which took part on the side of the U.S. in the Cold War. Their identity 
“crisis” was solved through NATO and an identity transformation from deterrence too defender of 
liberal values globally.
2
  
This was the starting point for a long range of changes for the SAF. Since the end of the Cold War, the 
SAF have changed from being manned by a general conscription army to a voluntary army, 
dismantling parts of the army and a “strategic time-out”. These changes have had a strong influence on 
the SAF and have led to an uncertainty about the purpose and identity of the SAF, both for the general 
public and the organization itself. For the SAF this was manifested in their “strategic time out”3 that 
they took after the fall of the Soviet Union. The uncertainty in identity amongst the general public 
regarding about the SAF was illustrated in the guidelines for the PR-campaign of 2006 “Vägen 
framåt” (The road forward). The campaign had a section called Kunskapskampanjen 
(Knowledgecampaign) that was specifically aimed at the general public. This part of the campaign had 
the explicit purpose of getting a “ökad kunskap hos allmänheten om insatsförsvaret”(raised increased 
public awareness of the rapid reaction force) due to the fact that the general public had very low 
opinion about the SAF in general but also about their ability to live up to their assignment.
4
 The aim of 
the campaign was to anchor an identity for the SAF fit for the post-Cold War world and the “new” 
                                                             
1 Ulf Bjereld in Brommesson & Ekengren (red), 2007 chapter. 3 
2 Hansen, 2006 p. 36 
3
 http://blogg.forsvarsmakten.se/kommentar/2012/01/15/fof-rikskonf-%E2%80%93-ob-anforande/ accessed 
2013-02-04 21:10 
4 4.23 Försvarsmakten 2006  
  
 
security logic or as described by the SAF, “Försvarsmaktens roll i en förändrad värld” (The role of the 
SAF in a changed world).
5
  
We will discuss the two security logics further under theoretical terms. The identity in the PR-
campaign was projected on to a general public but also inwards into the organization in order to give 
the people in military a good understanding of the SAF:s assignment in the post-Cold War era.
6
 While 
the process to create a formal identity through continuous PR-campaigns the military command ended 
its strategic “time out” recently.7 We will see consequences from this in the empirical material when 
Sverker Göranson expresses his view on the state of the SAF. We will see these two as manifestations 
of informal and formal identity; we will discuss these categories of identity further when discussing 
theoretical terms.  
2. Previous research with a focus on International Security Studies in relation to 
identity 
This study has a focus on security studies through identity creation, this warrants a short re-cap of 
security studies from the Cold War era and the post-Cold War period.
8
 The study also has a primarily 
focus of the European theater of the Cold War and its aftermath, specifically Sweden. During the Cold 
War the world was stable or constantly unstable depending on your view. This international climate 
fostered a research discipline focused on realism and states as the primary actor.
9
 The scenario that 
held the most urgency for researchers within security was an possible “warm” conflict between the 
two blocs East-West, Communism-Capitalism which was combined with military alliance along the 
same division, NATO for the West, led by the United States (US) and the WP led by the Soviet Union 
(USSR). Excluding some research fields “coming up” during the 70’s and 80’s,10 it was the end of the 
Cold War that really opened up the research field. The old thinking and the role of the armies started 
to be questioned by new challenges.
11
 Three, for this study, important and prominent researchers and a 
school are David Campbell, Lene Hansen and the Copenhagen school. Campbell focuses on the US 
and its identity in regards to threats to the national security.
12
  Lene Hansen focuses on the creation of 
a less than radical other during the Balkan wars.
13
 The Copenhagen school (which Lene Hansen is a 
part of) has focused on deepening and widening the security “dilemma”. Specific for this study is 
                                                             
5 Uppslag 4.23 Försvarsmakten 2006 
6 Ibid. 
7 http://blogg.forsvarsmakten.se/kommentar/2012/01/15/fof-rikskonf-%E2%80%93-ob-anforande/ accessed 
2013-02-04 21:10 
8 For a larger selection of previous research please see for example, amongst other; Collins (red.) 2010, Nye 
2009 and Barash, & Webel 2009 
9 Glaser  in Collins (red.) 2010 chapter. 1 
10 Buzan & Hansen 2009 p. 2 
11
 Buzan & Hansen 2009 p. 2ff 
12
 Campbell 1998 
13 Hansen 2006 
  
 
Copenhagen schools Securitization and De-Securitization and the “creation” of threats.14 In regards to 
Copenhagen school this study will not use Securitization per se because it is the identity of the SAF 
that is the focus. The threat comes to play only in a secondary role in this study. The creation of 
identity and the definition of the term will be discussed below under the section “Identity”. In regards 
to research about Sweden and its armed forces the research has focused mainly on how the 
transformation of the army is to be done and how well it has worked.
15
 Previous research concerning 
unresolved identities has mainly been done on “hot” cases such as Israel-Palestine conflict or less 
stable societies such as Northern Ireland.
16
 In comparison with precious research the case of the SAF 
and Sweden becomes an anomaly of sort considering the stability of the state and the lack of armed 
conflict in recent years. This study takes on a current discussion and for obvious reasons little research 
have been done on this issue because, to some extent, it is still ongoing. But there is still a general lack 
of research regarding how the formal and informal identities of the SAF are constructed and how 
compatible they are with each other and what the consequences may come from dual identities. This 
takes us to the next section, where we map out the aim of the study and the research questions. 
3. Aim of the study and research question 
There has been a lot of debate surrounding the Swedish armed forces touching on a variety of subjects 
such as new weapons systems
17
and the budget for the armed forces
18
, the latest debate started after 
Sverker Göransons interview in SvD which will be used as empirical material and will be discussed 
below. But there have been little discussion concerning the identity of the SAF and also the problem 
that may arise when a subject (the SAF) struggles with two identities. The SAF are trying to find its 
place within the Swedish state and society in the post-Cold War period, and when doing so, is trying to 
create an identity and justification for its existence. At the present time this study assumes that they 
have failed in doing so, as in so far as, they have not created a unison identity; rather they have, as 
discussed in the introduction, created two, possibly incompatible, identities. The aims of the study is to 
map out the two different identities within the Swedish military, and if they are compatible or if they 
are contradictory to each other. We will also discuss possible implications if these two identities are 
contradictory. It will only be speculative reasoning because the consequences have yet to materialize. 
- How is the two identities of the Swedish military constructed  
o What are the different referent objects that are to be secured 
o What are the different objects that threaten the referent object 
- Are the two identities compatible and what consequences may we see from them 
                                                             
14 Collins 2010 p. 91 Copenhagen distinctions 
15 See for example Bailes., Herolf & Sundelius  (red) 2006, Berggren (red) 2007 and Haldén 2007 
16
 See for example Brian Graham 2004, Williams and Paul (red.) 2012 p. 65ff and 70 
17
 http://www.dn.se/ekonomi/super-gripen-dyrare-an-beraknat accessed 2013-02-13 22:32 
18 http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=5438880 accessed 2013-02-13 22:35 
  
 
The answer to these questions will “trickle down” during the analytical section and then we will 
summarize and discuss them under the section End discussion and Conclusions. Already at this stage 
there is a point to be made that there is no clear distinction within the answer. Rather, when using 
Critical Discourse Analysis there is a interpretation of the material with a result that may be and 
should be contested by the reader and through a dialogue create a stronger research. We will get back 
to this issue under the presentation of the Critical Discourse Analysis. 
4. Theoretical terms and definitions 
All translations and emphasis was be done by the author unless noted. 
a. Securitization and Speech act 
The Copenhagen (CPH) School argues that security cannot be defined in objective terms; instead they 
argue that security is a speech act. This means that by saying “security” (not necessarily the word 
security) an authority actor within a specific field can claim a form of emergency for that sector.
19
 If 
the speech act is successful an issue can become Securitized and be presented in terms of security, as 
an existential threat.
20
 CPH describes that “In principle, [any] securitizing actors can attempt to 
construct anything as a referent object.”21 Referent object is in this context something that “which you 
can point to and say: ‘it has to survive, therefore it is necessary to [ . . . ]”.22 But CPH also point out 
that not every speech act is successful and that, in order to be successful, it must convince the relevant 
audiences, in this study the relevant audiences is the general public, we will elaborate on this later. 
They also give consideration to the history, geography and structural position of the state when 
considering the potential for a successful Securitization.
23
 In the material for this study we identify the 
speech act(ing) when “casting of the issue as one of an “existensial threat,” which calls for 
extraordinary measures beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics.”24 Although in this sense 
only the interview in SvD with Sverker Göranson can be consider “real” speech act. We still include 
the PR-campaign based on that it´s aim is to create something that is such a grave “threat” that it 
cannot be ignored and needs to be dealt with by the volunteer conscripts of the SAF. For our study we 
consider the two different identities as different forms of speech acts and that they both attempt to 
securitize two different issues based around two different security logics. We will not attempt to 
analyze the potential success of either Securitization attempts instead we will focus on the issue of 
promoting the two different identities that is the consequences of these two security logics.  
                                                             
19 Buzan & Hansen 2009  p. 33f 
20 Buzan & Hansen 2009 p. 214 
21 Buzan and Wæver 2009 pp 253-276 
22
 Buzan and Wæver 2009 pp 253-276 
23
 Buzan & Hansen 2009 p. 34 
24 Williams Dec., 2003 pp. 511-531 p. 514 
  
 
b. Security logics 
The two presentations of different security logics should be seen as ideal types in the Weber
25
 sense of 
the word and that both identities contain both logics but one is far more prevalent than the other and 
will therefore shape the SAF from one of the security logic.  
 
i. Cold War security 
During the Cold War the security was formed around the military and anything incorporated into the 
security sector was incorporated because of its impact on a states possibility to use force i.e. within the 
sphere of the military sector. Economic, technology or material resources were not a security issue in 
their own right; rather they were a security issue due to their possible implications for the military 
sector.
26
 There were two issues that primarily set the frame for security studies and the role for the 
military during the Cold War; Bipolarity (US vs. USSR, NATO vs. WP) and Nuclear weapons.
27
 The 
organization of  the “defense” during the Cold War evolved around nuclear weapons (for those who 
had them) and large standing armies or alliances (some choose to be neutral and instead focused on 
building armies, like Sweden which we will discuss below) all aimed at deterring an aggression from 
another state, alliance or bloc.
28
 Most of the security strategies during this time period evolved around 
the logic of realism.
29
 
ii. Post-Cold War security 
The collapse of the Soviet Union left a “hole”, so to say, for the western armies. They lost their 
traditional enemy and the centre for their defense structure as Russia (former USSR) and its military 
was in economical free fall.
30
 This opened for other sectors than the military sector to become included 
in the concept of security in their own right. An example of this is NATO:s identity transformation, 
from being based on deterrence against a territorial threat from the USSR and the WP in Europe to 
becoming a defender for liberal values on a global scale.
31
 After the middle of the 80’s there have been 
numerous account of different concepts of security presented, many of these are presented in Alan 
Collins book Contemporary security studies for those who wish to have a broader overview. For this 
study we will only discuss the ones relevant for our analysis. First concept is Human security which is 
based on the United Nations Human Development Report 1994 where it is stated that; “The concept of 
                                                             
25
 With Weber means the ideal type presented by Max Weber to be used for analytical purposes. Lundquist 
1993 p. 82f 
26 Buzan & Hansen 2009 p. 12 
27 Buzan & Hansen 2009 Chapter 4 and specifically p. 83 
28 Kaldor  2006 p. 32 
29
 Baylis, & Smith (red.) 2005 p. 164 
30
 Sverker Göranson reefers to this as a reason for the strategic time out in the SAF in the interview 
31 Hansen  2006 p. 36 
  
 
security has for too long been interpreted narrowly…” “- fighting a cold war all over the world.” “For 
many of them[ordinary people], security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, 
unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.”32 This moved 
the security concern from the State itself and instead focused on (ordinary) people. The move from 
state-centric security to other issues such as human security does not only stem from the end of the 
Cold War but also from the globalization process which gained even more momentum in the years 
after the end of the Cold War.
33
 The logic is that the problems of the “South” affects the states of the 
“North” and therefore cannot be ignored.34 Another issue related to human security is the 
Responsibility to protect (R2P) which contains the idea that sovereign states has the responsibility to 
the international community to prevent, react and rebuild in protection of populations (including 
populations of other states) when they are suffering serious harm. Such harm may be genocide or mass 
atrocities but it also, important for our study, includes a responsibility to rebuild polities and societies 
after a war or mass atrocities.
35
 
iii. Sweden during Cold War and Post-Cold War 
During the Cold War Sweden adapted a strict neutral stance towards the two military and ideological 
blocs NATO and the WP.
36
 Even though it was implicitly understood that NATO would come to the 
aid of Sweden in case of an assault by WP, which was the imagined enemy.
37
 During the years of the 
Cold War Sweden maintained a, for its size, huge army that would deter any form of aggression from 
another state, a defense against a mass invasion.
38
 For the purpose of having credibility in their policy 
of neutrality, Sweden also maintained a large military industry that was not compatible with any other 
states army (compare for example NATO and its ammunition that is compatible for every member 
states army)
39
 and also the development of their own high tech weapon system such as the fighter jet 
Jakt Attack Spaning JAS (Hunt Attack Reconnaissance).
40
 In other words, during the Cold War the 
SAF was an isolated island between two blocs of integrated armies with no official contact with either. 
After the end of the Cold War the SAF have done an enormous transformation of its size, its purpose 
and its international connections. Instead of “staying at home” as during the Cold War their 
“…internationella roll har ökat betydligt. Idag har försvaret ett större ansvar att upprätthålla den 
säkerhetspolitiska situationen i världen.” (international role have become significantly more important. 
                                                             
32
 Human development report. 1994, http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/ p. 22 Accessed 2013-02-16 
17:24 
33
 Abrahamsson 2008 p. 1 
34
 Abrahamsson 2008 p. 4 http://www.globalstudies.gu.se/digitalAssets/1274/1274383_abrahamsson_kina.pdf 
accessed 2013-02-16 16:42 
35 Collins 2010 p. 88 and p. 368ff 
36 Gustafsson 2007 p. 7 
37 Hugemark (red) 2006 p. 32 
38
 Bailes, Herolf, & Sundelius 2006 p. 142 
39
 Ibid. p. 142 
40 Haldén 2007 p. 58 
  
 
The military today have a greater responsibility to maintain the political security of the world).
41
 In 
their own words they say that; “Vi [The SAF] ska klara kvalificerad väpnad strid i ett multinationellt 
sammanhang. På marken, till sjöss och i luften. Det är det vi tränar oss inför.” (We [the SAF] shall be 
able to handle qualified armed combat within a multi-national context. On the ground, at sea and in the 
air. This is what we train for).
42
 Further down in the text we can notice that the SAF also have other 
purposes, although secondary to the one first stated. “Försvarsmakten har också andra viktiga 
uppgifter.” (The SAF also have other important assignments ) such as ”… bevakar Sveriges 
gränser…” (guarding Swedens borders) and “[the SAF] stöder också samhället vid större 
kriser…”(also support the society when larger crises accour) ”… om en person försvunnit…” (if a 
person gone missing). SAF have gone from large to slim, national to international, from static invasion 
defense to a dynamic operational defense, in short, a total reconstruction. 
c. Identity 
In this study we focus on the social identity. With social identity we mean the different form of 
purposes attributed to individuals, organizations, the self, and specific for the study, the military in 
relation to an other.
43
 Further we see identity, the self, as a part of the being, meaning part of 
everything and everyone and that it is created in relation to difference.
44
 We also assume that identity 
is temporal and is always changing and is in need of this difference in order to create and establish 
and/or maintain the identity of the self.
45
 This gives the consequences in our study that the SAF needs 
to identify itself with something different or something radical other, in order to be useful, to have a 
purpose or identity. Specifically for the military it needs to identify with an enemy to combat in one 
way or another to be able to create a purpose for itself, a raison d'État.
46
 
i. Formal identity 
With formal we mean the public identity that is displayed to a broader public. The formal identity that 
the SAF creates is, for this study, taken from the recruitment commercials that SAF ordered from the 
PR-company DDB called “Vad håller du på med?” GMU 4/5 2013. It is taken as the way SAF wants 
to be identified as and is also the way it has been politically decided that the SAF should be 
identified,
47
 this will be further discussed during the analysis of the material. The commercials are 
used for recruiting more people to the military and for this reason we see this as a formal way of 
presenting its identity. In this study this commercial campaign will be analyzed through a Critical 
                                                             
41 http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se/Forsvar/Om-forsvaret/Forsvar-i-forandring/ accessed 2013-02-16 18:17 
42 All quotes taken from: http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/om-forsvarsmakten/ accessed 2013-02-16 18:26 
43 Giddens & Birdsall 2003 p. 43f 
44 Campbell 1998 p. 9 
45
 Hansen 2006 p. 43 
46
 raison d'État means reason of state 
47 http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/12/29/57/853ca644.pdf accessed 2013-03-17  
  
 
Discourses Analysis (CDA) with the additional inclusion of Lene Hansens framework to give a deeper 
understanding of how the identity is created and in regards to who or what is constituted as a threat. 
Through the analysis we will then establish what identity is created through the commercial campaign 
with the help of a post-Cold War security logic. 
ii. Informal identity 
For this study the word informal indicate that it’s something without base in official documents and 
can sometimes be hard to identify. In this study the interview with Sverker Göranson, ciC of the SAF, 
in SvD 30 december 2012 will represent the informal identity.
48
 That his opinions in the interview 
were the informal view was indicated when attorney general Tomas "Spy prosecutor" Lindstrand 
started a preliminary investigation for crimes against national security due to Sverker Göransons 
statement.
49
 The investigation was dropped without any charges being filed against Sverker Göranson, 
but the reaction from the prosecution office and from other people gave a strong indication that it was 
not the formal views of the SAF.
50
 Also the fact that Sverker Göranson uses a different form of 
security logic compared to the formal identity further indicates that this is a different identity than the 
formal one, which we will discuss further in the analysis. 
5. Analytical method 
Critical Discourse Analysis in combination with Lene Hansen 
In this study we will use a version of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the main analytical method 
in combination with a modified version of Lene Hansens analytical framework presented in her book 
Security as Practice.
51
 The reason for choosing CDA over other analytical methods is because of the 
material in the study which warrants a method like CDA that enables the researcher to study wide 
variety of material such as moving clips and interview articles.
52
 How these analytical methods differ 
from the “textbook” version will be as far possible presented and discussed in the following. CDA is 
an interpretational form of analyze, this means that the interpretations are not beyond dispute. Rather 
this form of analyze is based on discussion and that the result can, and should be questioned, this 
leading to a better research results. To avoid unnecessary questioning of the result it is my role as 
analyzer to, as far as possible, be transparent with my interpretations of the material. The CDA will be 
combined with the framework for radical other and less than radical other created by Lene Hansen 
and Post-Cold War and Cold War security logic view of the material to be able to determine the 
security logic in the material. This form of analytical pattern takes the assumption that a text or a 
                                                             
48 http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/forsvar-med-tidsgrans_7789308.svd accessed 2013-02-04 18:23 
49 http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/ingen-forundersokning-mot-ob_7880148.svd accessed 2013-02-04 18:28 
50 http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/forsvarsministern-en-veckas-forsvar-ar-tillrackligt accessed 2013-02-04 
18:28 
51
 Hansen 2006 
52 Bergström & Boréus 2000, primarily chapter 6 which discusses Discourse Analysis 
  
 
speech (interview) is more than just an informational transporter; rather it sees this as a form of social 
action that aims at influencing its intended audience. This study will deal with different material, an 
interview in a daily news paper and a PR-campaign on display in different media, although we will 
only analyze the material used on screen, which we will discuss under the section empirical material. 
CDA analysts usually see texts and other material they use as a discourses in them self,
53
 in this study 
the material is given a “lesser” prominence i.e. the material is seen as trying to produce a certain 
identity in the surrounding discourse of society. The material is part of a discourse, not a discourse in 
itself, but we also see that the material represent two different security discourses within society. CDA 
takes the standpoint that all form of social relations and society is characterized by conflict and power 
relations. This means that communication through speech, written text, photography and such is more 
or less steeped in ideology, accepted truths by the ruling discourse. Society is seen as an ongoing 
process where this communication affects the society within which it is produced and consumed.
54
  
When it comes to the identity within the realm of security in the post-Cold War it has become more 
instable than during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has led to “identities previously not 
articulated [may have] become important”.55 This opens up the field for a form of struggle in the 
public sphere of what the security identity should engulf.  
We will now go over to discuss Lene Hansen terminology and framework that warrants a short 
explanation of the terms and their meaning before we move forward. We will not use the full 
terminology or framework but in order to make coherent discussion of her research and our version of 
it, it is warranted to evolve it a little broader than we will use it: 
 Self – the I, who we are, For our study this will be the SAF and how they perceive and wish to 
be perceived 
 Radical otherness – Something to identify against and that needs to be dealt with (destroy or 
neutralized). In historic Sweden this has been Russia/USSR, unknown “evil” people “over 
there” creating a situation of emergency that requires response from the Self 
 Less than radical otherness – Someone or something that is different from the Self but can be 
saved. Someone or something that is not fully like us, but have potential to be. Can be a 
civilian population in a conflict or an opposition “we” support. 
 Spatial – The physical placing of the identity, can be that the identity is savage Russian or 
barbaric. 
 Temporal – The timely placing of the identity, can the identity change, evolve or transform 
over time or not. The idea of development or democratization possibilities is example of this. 
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55 Hansen 2006 p. 40 
  
 
 Ethical identities – The articulation of responsibility in an identity, that the Self have a 
responsibility toward the Other. An example of this is The white mans burden.
56
 
Our analytical framework will be much more limited than Lene Hansen, and this will only be a quick 
review of her research. If the reader would like a better examination and explanation of this theory 
Lene Hansens book Security as practice is highly recommended. For the following text chapter 3 of 
Lene Hansens mentioned book has been used, notes will only be used at direct quotes.  
When presenting her framework Lene Hansen discusses the term basic discourse and that a basic 
discourse manifests the “main points of contestation within a debate”.57 This term requires a larger 
body of empirical material than this study has at its disposal and the study is not wide enough to reach 
conclusions regarding other discourse present in society so the usage of this term is mute. Although 
we may argue that the formal and informal identity are the basic discourses of the debate. Due to the 
fact that the two different logics and by extension their identities have been the main structural 
position in the debate. This will be discussed during the analysis of the material and the following end 
discussion. In relation to this, Hansen argues for a large amount of empirical material (texts) for fully 
understanding and mapping out the identities. Since this study uses SAF:s formal material aimed at 
creating identity and gain voluntary conscripts and text material by the ciC of the SAF we consider 
that this limited study still have enough relevant empirical material to answer the questions for this 
study. Also we base this decision on the placing of the material in this study: The PR-campaign is 
advertised nationwide both in print and television
58
 and the interview in SvD which is one of 
Sweden’s biggest newspapers. Hansen further discusses “key representation of identity”59 which can 
be metaphors or geographical identities which signals a basic discourse. Considering our small amount 
of empirical material we will broaden our approach and instead use CDA to identify how the rhetoric 
congregates around certain security logic. Hansen also discusses conceptual histories of the 
representations, for our study we will use the two security logics as historical representations. Her 
fourth point discusses that the Other and Selves should differ in the three different constructions 
(spatial, temporal and ethical). We will limit the study to what construction that are articulated in the 
material which means that if a construction is absent it will not influence the analysis. Her fifth point 
states that the basic discourses should advocate different policies. As discussed above this will be 
discussed under the analysis and the discussion but we will refrain from the terminology of basic 
discourse due to the limitations of the study.  
In summary: in this study we will use the concept of Identity to define the different aspects of the role 
of the SAF. We will consider the PR-campaign and the interview with Sverker Göransons as forms of 
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Speech act that try to Securitize different issues with different security logics and thereby secure their 
identity within the realm of society. 
6. Empirical material 
In the context of this study and it aims, the relevant material will be what that general public will take 
part of, in other words the PR material and the interview. For this study we have chosen to use the 
ongoing PR campaign for recruiting new soldier called “Vad håller du på med?” and the statement by 
the ciC of the SAF made while the PR campaign was still ongoing. The choice to use this material is 
based on the fact that both of these “speech acts” were performed during the same time period and 
they appeal to the general public. The PR-campaign is obviously aimed at a broad audience. Sverker 
Göransons interview also has the aim of influencing the wider public, as compared to, for example, his 
speech at Sälen some weeks later at the annual Folk och försvars rikskonferens in which he addressed 
a far smaller group and also chose a clearly different form of expression when articulating possible 
threats.
60
 Also there’s a timely reason, the Swedish parliament will decide on a new budget for the 
SAF during this year (2013) which, Sverker Göranson alludes to in the interview, which gives a 
greater tendency to create a sense of urgency in the threat in order to gain more allocation (for Sverker 
Göranson).In regards to the empirical material chosen, we limit ourselves from doing any 
generalization on the basis of this material other than the situation at present. But we can trace the 
formal identity of the SAF in regards to the PR aspect back to at least as early as 2006 when trying to 
establish an identity that is in line with the identity they are still trying to establish today.
61
 As for the 
informal identity we cannot make any generalization other than that Sverker Göransons opinion are 
most likely fairly constant over time and that he has maintained these opinions from taking office up 
until now or when the assumptions he base his opinions on took place. For this study we are not 
concerned with actual measure of credibility of the different threats or any sort of analytical position in 
regards to the salience of the threats. In this study we are focused on the identity the SAF wants to 
create in the public sphere or discourse and their possible consequences. As discussed earlier during 
formal and informal identity, these two speech acts will represent each of the identities within SAF. 
We identify the two points as different attempts to securitize different issues through different security 
logics and by doing so performing a form of speech act towards a relevant audience, the general 
public. Since Sweden is a democratic state its population is an important audience in a strong position 
to influence the politicians and how the budget is spent and what political decisions are made. 
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a. The campaign “Vad håller du på med?” (What are you doing?)62 
This campaign is in the same vain as the 2006 PR campaign “Vägen framåt” (The road forward).63 The 
goal of that campaign was to give the wider public a (better) understanding of what the SAF does. The 
SAF describe that they focus on international assignment and peace assignments in the international 
arena, an identity based on a Post-Cold War logic.
64
 We can see the current PR-campaign as a 
continuation of the same, meaning reach new recruits and inform the public of the still “new” tasks for 
the SAF. Although the earlier campaign in 2006 was more focused on incorporation of the wider 
public, the later one is to a higher degree aimed at new recruits.
65
 As mentioned earlier, we see it as a 
speech act in so far as they present an issue of such an emergency that people voluntarily will enlist 
and risk their life for it. 
The campaign consists of;  
 4 commercial clips, each approx 45 seconds long 
 3 letters directly sent to people 
 5 billboards with motives connected to the commercial clips 
 5 radio spots that are in the same “manner” as the commercial clips, although not the same 
“issues” 
 3 banners for homepages, with the same motives as the billboards.  
For our analysis we will use the 4 commercial clips since the rest of the material in all intents and 
purpose display the same message and is centered on the same question “Vad håller du på med?” 
(What are you doing?) but the clips contain the most material for analysis. 
The clips are without dialogue and consist of people doing a variation of questionable activities and 
ends with a phrase that look to encourage people to participate in different form of military activates. 
We will evolve on this during the analysis. Each clip will be shortly described in Appendix I with a 
direct link to each clip. In the analysis we will only present the “tag-line” of each clip and analyze 
what kind of identity and security logic is behind.  
b. The interview with Sverker Göranson in SvD66  
The statement Sverker Göranson did in SvD was in an interview where he expressed his views on that 
state of the SAF. He expressed an alarming opinion that the SAF were in such a bad shape that they 
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would only withstand an armed aggression for less than one week. We might debate if it is reasonable 
that the SAF should be able to withhold an attack longer than one week or not, but it was framed as an 
issue of great urgency. It was a speech act in so far as Sverker Göranson was trying to grant 
emergency status for the SAF and when doing so trying to alter the public’s perception of the SAF. 
We will discuss this further in the analysis. In regards to the relation between what the journalist 
writes and what Sverker Göranson says we view it as that they both are making the speech act. 
Sverker Göranson is the authority to speak, the journalist works as a megaphone to deliver the 
message. Mikael Holmström, the journalistic author, have done interviews with many of the previous 
ciC over the years and have a record of writing articles that correlates with what the interviewed 
person wished to say. In a conversation with Mikael, he described that he has not had a case of 
misquoting anyone during his 30 year long career. Even though Sverker Göranson did not have a final 
say, in regards to the final version of the article, we still see it as, what the journalist writes is coherent 
with what Sverker Göranson said and that the message in the text is Sverker Göransons. We base this 
assumption both on the long record of Mikaels work but also that Sverker Göranson most likely hand-
picked the journalist for the interview. We can see the interview as a conversation where the journalist 
and the ciC takes turn in confirming each other’s statements, this will be clearer during the analysis. 
The interview will be presented in its entirety in Appenix II with additional marking for each 
paragraph for easier read for the readers. 
7. Analysis  
a. Analysis of the PR-campaign 
“Vad håller du på med?” 
In the PR-campaign we don’t see an archetypical securitization. But considering that the SAF asks 
people to risk their life and well being it is still a matter of securitizing an issue and a grave threat and 
danger to the self projected through the message in the campaign. Also, the PR-campaign has a lesser 
need to articulate a form of threat of urgency in a specific temporal or spatial form because the logic it 
is based in has been hegemonic for several years after the end of the Cold War and the structural 
reformation of the SAF from an invasion defense to a flexible defense. This can be seen if we compare 
the PR clips of the campaign of 2006 “Vägen framåt” (The road forward) to the clips used in this 
study. In the clips from 2006 a connection between Sweden’s security and the insecurity of the world 
“out there” is explicitly expressed.67 As discussed earlier, the clips do not contain any spoken 
dialogue; instead the focus is on portraying regular people doing “meaningless” actions. This is 
followed by the question “Vad håller du på med? (What are you doing?). This is played out as a 
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provocative question, implying that what you (the person in the clip and the audience) is doing is not 
as important as what the SAF is doing. In the following we will focus on what the SAF presents that 
they are doing. We will analyze these presentations from a post-Cold War logic.  
Clip 1 – Post-it  
At the end of the clip the campaign slogan is shown “Vad håller du på med?” (What are you doing? - 
This is repeated in each clip) and then comes the line “Vi håller på med att undsätta drabbade efter 
stormar” (We are rescuing victims after storms) 
In this message there is no clear indication if this is a national or an international operation but we can 
assume they refer to a storm within the nation because, if it’s an international operation it is usually 
described as victims of a catastrophe as we will see further down. But this statement put people in the 
centre of the operation, and also society at large by extension. The centering is around the security of 
people instead of a state, i.e. Human security, a post-Cold War logic. 
Clip 2 – Inredning (Home decoration) 
“Vi håller på med att säkra mattransporter vid humanitära katastrofer.” (We are securing food 
transportations during humanitarian disasters.) 
In this message we see a clear international angle, the securing of food supply during humanitarian 
disasters. This could mean earthquakes, tsunamis and such which primarily happens in areas outside of 
Sweden and Europe (possibly with the exception for Turkey if we count it to Europe). The logic in this 
statement is that the consequences of a disaster may cause a large population to be vulnerable and in 
need of food, shelter and security in the risk of becoming radicalized. This population is temporally 
placed as being able to change, a less than radical other that we therefore need to help. The logic is 
that due to their grievances in their situation they may be victims of influence from radical others that 
either provide them with food, shelter and security and then count on them for support in a struggle for 
their own aim or influence them to direct their anger towards the West. So in order to avoid this 
radicalization to threaten the West or Sweden the SAF takes on the mission to radicalize these people 
for their own aim. The thought behind is that in the globalised world, what happens somewhere effects 
everyone everywhere, a post-Cold War logic.   
Clip 3 – Frukost (Breakfast) 
“Vi håller på med att försvara mänskliga rättigheter i krigshärjade länder” (We are defending human 
rights in war-torn countries) 
This goes back to the previous clip, with a presentation of an international operation based on creating 
a better life for less than radical others. This form of justification for an international operation is in 
  
 
line with the concept or R2P and clearly presents the assignment within a post-Cold War security 
logic. In this operation, instead of providing food transportation the SAF needs to go abroad to 
implement western humanitarian rights and create a less radical other that won’t threaten the self (the 
West or Sweden) in the globalised world. The difference is that this would be in a post-war country 
compare to the previous which was situated in a country or place which was disaster torn. The 
difference would mean the soldier run a higher risk of danger in a war-torn country considering the 
possibility of post-conflict weapons in circulation.  
Clip 4 – Ballong (Balloon) 
“Vi håller på att säkra mattransporter vid humanitära katastrofer” (We are securing food 
transportations during humanitarian disasters.) 
This is a repetition of the message in the second clip and the same logic applies. 
b. Analysis of the interview with Sverker Göranson in SvD 
The interview is first presented with a large picture of Sverker Göranson putting on (or taking off) his 
military coat. Compare this to military personal wearing a suit for example, which gives a more 
bureaucratic impression. This gives a signal off, amongst other things, that he is in touch with the 
military and he speaks with knowledge of the area. We will connect back to this in the textual part of 
the article. 
In the headline we can read that there is a time limit on the Swedish defense “Försvar med tidsgräns” 
(Defense with a time limit), a reference to a state of emergency. 
This is followed by a lead section that puts the situation in the present and the immediate urgency of 
the matter “Om Sverige idag angrips militärt kan vi i bästa fall försvara oss i en vecka” (If Sweden 
today is military attacked we can at best defend ourselves for a week). It is in the best possible way 
that Sweden may defend itself for a week, but it’s likely less time than that. It indicates that it is more 
likely Sweden will fall sooner than a week. This puts further emphasizes on the urgency of a threat 
even though it’s an indirect threat (If). After this we note that, this is how the situation really is, 
Sverker Göranson is speaking “klarspråk”(similar to speaking frankly or honestly in English) in the 
article according to the journalist. 
Going down to the first paragraph Sverker Göranson moves the temporal placing of the threat to the 
future in “fem till tio år” (five to ten years) and references what his legacy may be. He also positions 
the reason why this threat has been able to occur: “[anslagen] inte räcker […] till försvar som 
riksdagen beslutat om” ([the funding] is not enough […] for the defense the parliament have decided). 
This shows both the perceived problem and the solution to the problem, the government need to 
allocate more money to the defense otherwise the SAF cannot live up to their obligations. The 
  
 
wording indicates that this is the definitive problem and that the solution is the opposite i.e. more 
money.  
In the second paragraph we are told that Sverker Göranson has been ciC since 2009. We also find out 
that he is travelling on the behalf of official mission, travelling to the north of Sweden (Kiruna) to 
thank the people that had taken part in a rescue mission for Norwegian pilots that were involved in a 
crash during a NATO exercise. 
Going to the third paragraph the journalist situates the ciC in a position of knowledge and authority 
within the field he speaks about. The journalist does this by describing how Sverker Göranson takes of 
his “vapenrock” (weapons coat), indicating that he is official and in touch with his job(compare to the 
earlier discussion about military personnel in suits), the journalist also describes that Sverker 
Göransons weapons coat is decorated with “eklöv” (oak leafs) and “fyra stjärnor i guld” (four stars of 
gold) indicating that the ciC is a decorated and experienced leader within the military field and there 
for speaks with authority. Then the journalist once more remarks that the ciC is on a “tjänsteresa” 
(official mission), then he goes on to describe that the ciC is still “smärt” (athletic) making a nod that 
the ciC is “still with it” and hasn’t lost touch with the people on the “ground”. After this the journalist 
makes an analogy that the ciC may be in shape but the SAF is not, this also sets the tone for the 
interview as we will see further down. 
In the fourth paragraph we get a short historical backdrop with references to the former chief of the 
military intelligence service Stefan Kristiansson and his warning about Russia re-arming. This 
“warning” from Stefan was apparently not heeded by the government and “[m]ånga befarar att detta är 
inedningen på ett nytt “stålbad”” (many fear this is prelude to a new “steel bath”, a reference to severe 
financial cuts). In this paragraph we find the first allusion to the Cold War enemy Russia and that the 
defense should be financed based on the threat that Russia poses against Sweden. 
In the fifth paragraph the journalist asks the question “Kan vi försvara oss?” (Can we defend ourself?) 
with a reference to Krigsvetenskapsakademien (the War science academy) who asked this “kärnfråga” 
(essential question) the previous spring (2012). This reference is used to indicate that this is not a new 
question and aims at giving further urgency to the matter of the state of the SAF. This can be seen 
when the journalist phrases it as “redan i våras” (already last spring). Before the ciC replies the 
journalist puts emphasis that this answer is the real truth saying that the ciC’s answer is “klartext” 
(similar to speaking frankly or honestly in English). The ciC then replies “Vi kan försvara oss mot ett 
angrepp med ett begränsat mål. Vi talar om ungefär en vecka på egen hand.” (We can defend ourself 
against an attack with a limited target. We are talking about one week by ourself.) The only “enemy” 
mentioned in the article so far is Russia, so it can be assumed that this “threat” that Sweden only can 
defend against for a week is Russia. 
  
 
Then in the seventh paragraph the journalist takes the scenario of an attack further and asks what 
happens if Sweden is attacked from two directions at the same time. The ciC answer “Nej, då klarar vi 
inte av det särskilt länge, så är fakta” (No, then we won’t resist for long, that is the fact). Here is a 
further emphasis on the seriousness of the matter, that this is not a guess or an opinion, it is a fact. 
In the ninth paragraph the journalist describes what the ciC say “…de militära hoten man ser mot 
Sverige är av ett annat slag än kalla krigets stora invasioner.” (…the military threat against Sweden is 
of a different kind than the large scale invasions of the Cold War) This indicating that the SAF has 
adapted a post-Cold War logic, but we will come back to this when the ciC discusses the situation in 
the surrounding geography today. After this remark it’s described how the SAF exercise with a post-
Cold War security logic in “hemliga [krigs] spel” (secret [war] games) “…utsätts Sverige för 
begränsade militära våldshandlingar.” (Sweden is subjected to limited violent military actions) 
“…angripares syfte [är att] ställa Sverige inför fullbordat faktum” (the attackers aim [is to] set Sweden 
to a fait accompli), “…genom att slå ut en storstad eller inte ett begränsat geografiskt område.” (by 
taking out a large city or a limited geographical area.) This is not the post-Cold War security logic 
adopted by the PR-campaigns but it is not the security logic of the Cold War, rather it can be seen as 
something in between the two. Although it is not clear if this military attack is going to be performed 
by an organized army (like the Russian) or a band of “unorganized” extremists using terror tactics. But 
the only articulated threat have been Russia and as we will see further in the article, it is the only one.  
Then in the following paragraphs the question about Sweden’s defense capabilities is asked again and 
with a similar response. Then the ciC goes on and discusses the possibilities of NATO helping 
Sweden. This gives a strong indication that the enemy is Russia considering the historical roots of 
NATO and the historical discussion in Sweden referencing to NATO as protection against WP and 
USSR. Also if the reasoning only concern state vs. state threat there is not many other options 
considering that NATO includes most countries in Europe.
68
 The journalist and the ciC also discuss 
the other Nordic countries in non threatening wordings placing them outside the temporal placing of 
the threat. Then the ciC frames the threat in a definitive way: “Västvärlden kommer sannolikt också att 
vara engagerad i vad som händer oss” (The western world will most likely also be engaged in what is 
happening to us). It is clear that the threat do not come from the west, notice how this term to divide 
the world (Västvärlden/Western world) comes the Cold War logic. Then the ciC remarks that he 
cannot see a scenario where Sweden is attacked and nothing is going on in the “omvärlden” (the wider 
world ) considering the change of wording this likely means that the attack would most likely be part 
of a larger conflict. With this imagined scenario by the ciC it is unlikely he believes that there will be a 
                                                             
68 Member states of NATO are (as of 2013) Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the 
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limited attack by none-state actors or a limited attack by another state on Sweden, rather a full scale 
war between states. This further position the ciC’s strategic reasoning in Cold War security logic with 
large scale invasion wars. 
Then we move to the next, the sixteenth, paragraph there the journalist further emphasis that this is 
something“…som inte hörts på sjutton år.“ (that hasn’t been heard in seventeen years) “[att en] ÖB har 
[…] talats klarspråk” ([that an] ciC has […] spoken honestly). 
In the next paragraph we get a short historical re-cap about the development of the SAF from 1996 
until today. It is described how the SAF have been dismantled and the strategic planning for defending 
Sweden’s territory ceased. This was because the “Sovjetimperiet” (The Soviet Empire) had 
disintegrated and that the Russian military was in “fritt fall” (free fall). 
This is followed by, in the next paragraph, that the ciC describe that the “[o]säkerheten har ökat” (The 
insecurity has increased) in contrast to the earlier situation. Now we can clearly see that the threat is 
Russia, if we consider what has been said so far in the interview and what we will see in the next 
paragraph. We will also see clear reference to the Cold War enemy the Soviet Union.  
In the nineteenth paragraph the temporal creation and spatial placing of the threat becomes concrete. 
The spatial placing of the insecurity is “när Ryssland-Georgien kriget bröt ut 2008” (when the Russia-
Georgia war broke out in 2008). This gives us a time and an actor, but it is not the actor Russia that is 
the primary threat, instead it is the Russian leader Putin. “Ryssland under […] Putin [har] antagit 
alltmer sovjetiska drag” (Russia under […] Putin [has] taken on increasingly soviet traits) temporally 
placing Putin in the era of the Soviet Union. Now the spatial enemy from the Cold War is brought 
back and in the next sentence “…paras med en kraftfull rysk upprustning som svenska försvaret kan 
följa på nära hall” (…combined with a powerfull rearmament that the Swedish armed forces can watch 
closely). This gives indications that the SAF and the ciC have good knowledge about the Russian 
forces and the leaders (Putin) intent which heightening the threat to security posed by Russia. 
Then in the twentieth paragraph the ciC reaffirms this, describing that the “Normalbilden” (Normal 
picture: How things usually have been – Authors explanation) has changed compared to that of 10 
years ago. “Det är allt större, allt mer komplexa övningar [som ryssarna utför].” (It is a lot bigger, a lot 
more complex exercises [that the Russians are doing].) These exercises are done in the waters close to 
Sweden, the Baltic sea and the Norwegian sea indicating the Russians are creeping closer. 
In the next paragraph we learn that the SAF have now begun to plan for a defense of the Swedish 
territory. But, the new SAF is so slimmed that “…hälften av stridsflyget och många fartyg […] 
[saknade] personal” (…half of the war planes and many ships […] [were missing] personnel) so they 
were unable to be operational during 2012. So the SAF now sees a threat and tries to plan for it but are 
unable to fulfill their assigned duty due to a lack of monetary resources.  
  
 
The two following paragraphs contain numbers to describe the information in the previous paragraph.  
The next, twenty-fourth, paragraph the journalist illustrate this issue further when asking “…utan mer 
pengar måste man lägga ner en försvargren,” (…without more money do you have to terminate a 
defense branch,) and the ciC replies with shortly with a “Ja” (Yes). 
In the last two paragraphs of the interview the journalist presents a time limit on when a solution to the 
spatial framing of these threats have to be realized. On the first of March the ciC is due to deliver his 
own proposed efficiency proposals and proposed cut backs for the SAF. This also gives a time limit on 
the securitization, before this date the ciC must convince the general public (relevant audience) and 
them in turn must convince the politicians before this date so he may get the budget so that the SAF 
may be able to counter this threat before it is too late.  
c. Summary 
As we can see, the PR-campaign is firmly placed in the post-Cold War logic with a focus on securing 
humans that are threatened by a unknown object or by disorder in the society. While in the interview 
the threat is centered around Russia in a Cold War security logic with a state as a referent object and 
the only possible external help can only be obtained from NATO. Even though the “argumentation” in 
the PR-material is not as explicit or centered around an explicit grave threat it is still clear the security 
logic of the message is that of post-Cold War. Considering the hegemonic position of this security 
logic the SAF do not need to raise the same level of urgency as the challenging security logic. 
Compare this to the earlier PR-campaigns which had a more emphasis on creating a hegemonic 
position of the new logic i.e. persuading the general public of the SAF new role and the urgency of the 
threat. Compared with the interview we can see that Sverker Göranson uses a far more urgent way of 
describing the situation. Even though Sverker Göranson mentions that SAF:s strategy today is based 
on that there will be a limited attack, it does not appear that he believes it himself. At least we can see 
that he alludes to an all out war between states and that the state needs to be secured against territorial 
threats.  The messages in the PR clips have a strong focus on a mobile military that will work all over 
the world, wherever there is a need for relief food or for upholding western version of human rights. 
This means that the defense needs to be small and flexible. Rather it’s a matter of logistics (to 
transport the troops and food all over the world) and small units to perform these tasks (rescue a 
person in distress or securing a food transport). The end result is a small army with large resources for 
transportation that can be deployed rapidly. In Sverker Göransons security logic it is the opposite, the 
SAFs assignment is to protect the Swedish state from a possible aggressive Russia. We can understand 
from Sverker Göransons reasoning that the SAF should be built around the logic of the Cold War and 
that the defense of Sweden should be able to withstand an invasion, from Russia. This would mean a 
organization of the military like the one before the end of the Cold War, a large defense centered on 
mass mobilization and general conscription. Although this time around it seems like it is not based on 
  
 
the principle of neutrality, rather it is explicitly discussed a scenario of holding out until NATO would 
come to Sweden’s aid. This form of defense is static, large and prepared for a large scale invasion with 
a small focus on issues within a post-Cold War security logic. International operations are mentioned, 
but instead of securing human rights or securing food transports its focus are on getting better at 
defending against an attacker in co-operation with other (NATO) armies. 
8. Conclusions and discussion 
We can see that the SAF are trying to create an identity against two different types of threat a 
aggressive state or a somewhat abstract threat of disorder and human suffering based in two different  
security logics. This has, as we mentioned in the analysis far reaching consequences in how the SAF is 
organized. Eva Haldén describes the two different ways of organizing as direct opposites of each 
other.
69
 Based on Haldén this leads to a conclusion that this split identity can have negative 
consequences for the SAF. One important issue to consider is, what the potential recruits believe they 
enlist for. As described in Transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces, “recruitment and selection 
are […] fundamental to the ability of the [SAF] to successfully accomplish the tasks assigned to 
them.”70 When two different identities are presented to the general public suitable recruits may be hard 
to find. In regards to the general public, when this identity “struggle” is done in the eye of the public it 
may hamper the trust the general public has for the SAF, as was indicate in a SIFO
71
 survey done by 
SVT.
72
 The survey gave a result that showed that 39 percent of the Swedish population feels unsafe 
with the SAFs ability to defend the Swedish territory.
73
 There is no estimate on how much influence 
on public opinion Sverker Göransons interview had but since the debate is attributed to the interview 
we can assume it has had some effect on the general perception. The feeling of safety is an important 
factor in this regard, just like a bank people need to trust the institutions to function, so does the SAF. 
So when this identity “battle” is done with the general public as an audience and the issues is draped in 
such a daunting and intimidating manner it may have counterproductive effect, i.e. low level of trust. 
Another issue that has been contested due to this dual identity is how large the budget SAF needs and 
what it is supposed to be used for and the possibility for an alliance with the war-driven organization 
NATO.
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There is a risk of a problem when the debate surrounding the SAF does not touch upon the issue of 
these two incompatible identities and their implications. The debate has mainly evolved around the 
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 Haldén 2007 p. 45 
70 Berggren (red) 2007 chapter. 1 Carlstedt, Berit and Carlstedt Leif, quote taken from p. 20  
71 SIFO is a survey company in Sweden and stands for Svenska institutet för opinionsundersökningar (the 
Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research) 
72 SVT stands for Sveriges Television (Swedish Television) and is the biggest TV-channel in Sweden and is a 
public service channel owned by the Swedish state 
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 http://www.svt.se/nyheter/sverige/bara-var-fjarde-svensk-trygg-med-forsvaret accessed 2013-03-16 22:21 
74 http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/reinfeldt-forsvaret-ar-ett-sarintresse accessed 2013-03-06 22:33 
  
 
budget, the reason (identity) for either budgetary proposal have been taken for a given. Either Russia is 
seen as a credible, future, threat or the state as a referent object or it is dismissed as a fictive 
rambling.
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 The dismissive side of the debate focuses on human security with civilians(less than 
radical others) being the referent object and vague radical others as a threat. Without a stable identity 
for the SAF is there is a chance that the general public may be split in their perception of what the 
purpose of the SAF and this could lead to, as we have already seen, a lowering of the trust for the SAF 
and their ability to perform their assignment. The possible consequences of a low trust for the SAF can 
be that it becomes wrongfully funded when no one is sure of their assignment, a widely prevalent lack 
of trust for the SAF that by extension can affect the state and government in their ability to gain trust 
amongst the population in regards to safety.  
Most important conclusion 
We established that this is a case of a defense force that struggle with incompatible identities. This 
gives us helpful tools when assessing the reason and credibility for the alarming reports about the 
horrific state of the Swedish defense. 
In regards to generalization of the result it is hard to make any as previous research regarding identity 
conflict mentioned earlier had shown not to be applicable in this case, we must considering the 
uniqueness of each case and study. Other states have experienced similar identity issues but none 
exactly as Sweden which makes a generalization of the material impossible. But the analytical 
framework, for this study, can be applied in a general manner. The framework can work on different 
case studies similar to this one, but it may need modification, to gain insight and understanding in the 
specifics of other states and their processes of their armed forces and identity creation. 
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Appendix I 
Clip 1 – Post-it  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=TS5o0p-LdV8 accessed 2013-03-12 
The clip starts with a view of an office-landscape with a young man strolling a cart. He reaches a desk 
and climbs upon it. Then he begins putting up post-it notes on a window above the desk while we hear 
birds singing in the background. Afterwards the viewer can see that the post-it notes forms a shape of 
computer-game figures. These figures are similar to those of the graffiti artist Banksy that became 
famous through the movie Exit through the gift shop. After this a woman enters the room and gives the 
young man a strange look while she is xeroxing, after which he sits down and gazes upon his work. 
Then the name of the campaign is shown “Vad håller du på med?” (What are you doing? - This is 
repeated in each clip) and then comes the line “Vi håller på med att undsätta drabbade efter stormar” 
(We are rescuing victims after storms) that describes what the SAF are doing. 
 
Clip 2 – Inredning (Home decoration) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Ojl1RGlabo4 accessed 2013-03-12 
A young man in an apartment stares at a coffee table and begins to sort a pile of newsmagazines after 
some considering. He then walks to a windows and begins to sort a pile of magazines on the window 
ledge. Meanwhile we can also see through the window and see that he is in a high-rise building. He 
continues to do this until the campaign slogan is shown, and then comes the line “Vi håller på med att 
säkra mattransporter vid humanitära katastrofer.” (We are securing food transportations during 
humanitarian disasters.) 
 
Clip 3 – Frukost (Breakfast) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Lkh_gKL4Vn0 accessed 2013-03-12 
A young woman takes pictures with her mobile phone of her breakfast. She tries to fix the breakfast 
plate so that it will look good in the picture. While she is doing this, a man wakes up in the next room; 
he looks briefly at her and then walks away from the clip. The young woman then stands up on the 
table to take more pictures, assumingly to get a better angle. This being a reference to Facebook and 
instagram where it is popular to take pictures of what you eat in the morning, usually with some 
catchy line. After this comes the PR-slogan and then the line “Vi håller på med att försvara mänskliga 
rättigheter i krigshärjade länder” (We are defending human rights in war-torn countries) 
 
Clip 4 – Ballong (Balloon) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=SD4sLtlt_OM accessed 2013-03-12 
The clip starts with a view of a common room in a student dorm, and then the camera moves into one 
of the student rooms. In the room we can see a young man sitting on a bed in front of his computer. He 
puts a gigantic balloon on his head and tries to pull it over himself. After he gives up trying he gives a 
  
 
sign to the computer. This gives a indication that the web camera on the computer was filming him 
during his attempt with the ballon. This clip is a reference to the many viral videos on youtube where 
people do things out of the ordinary and, by broadcasting it on the internet, gain fame and sometimes 
become rich. Although in the clip it seems like the young man fails in his attempt. After this comes the 
PR-slogan and after that the message “Vi håller på att säkra mattransporter vid humanitära katastrofer” 
(We are securing food transportations during humanitarian disasters.) is shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix II 
http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/forsvar-med-tidsgrans_7789308.svd accessed 2013-02-04 18:23 
Headline  Försvar med tidsgräns  
Lead Om Sverige i dag angrips militärt kan vi i bästa fall försvara oss i en vecka – därefter 
måste vi få hjälp från andra länder. Inför hotet om nya nedskärningar av försvaret i en 
allt mer osäker värld så talar överbefälhavare Sverker Göranson klarspråk.  
 
ÖB Sverker Göransson. 
Foto: yvonne åsell 
30 december 2012 kl 21:58 , uppdaterad: 24 februari 2013 kl 18:33  
Paragraph 1 ”Försvarsmakten och dess personal levererar kanonkvalitet varje dag, men jag har 
också ett ansvar för att våra efterträdare om fem eller tio år ges samma förutsättningar”, 
säger en bekymrad Sverker Göranson eftersom anslagen inte räcker till för det försvar 
som riksdagen beslutat om. Här under en tjänsteresa i försvarets TP 100 (Saab 340) 
Bromma–Kiruna nyligen.  
Paragraph 2 Sverker Göranson har varit överbefälhavare sedan 2009. SvD följde honom på en 
tjänsteresa till Kiruna, dit han reste för att tacka alla dem som deltog i röjnings- och 
räddningsarbetet efter olyckan den 15 mars i år, då ett norskt Herculesplan som ingick i 
en Natoövning och skulle ha landat i Kiruna kraschade in i Kebnekaise. Alla fem 
norska officerare ombord omkom.  
Paragraph 3 General Göranson tar av sig sin vapenrock med eklöv och fyra stjärnor i guld innan 
han sätter sig till rätta i flygplansstolen under en tjänsteresa. Trots tre år på ÖB-stolen är 
Sverker Göranson fortfarande smärt. Även om ÖB själv verkar vara i god form är det 
tveksamt om det också gäller Sveriges hårt bantade militära försvar.  
  
 
 
Paragraph 4  I en SvD-intervju den 27 september varnade den avgående chefen för den militära 
underrättelsetjänsten, Stefan Kristiansson, för Rysslands upprustning. Han ansåg att den 
borde påverka nästa svenska försvarsbeslut 2015. En vecka senare gav regeringen den 4 
oktober motsatt signal: Ekonomin för försvaret är given fram till 2019 och ÖB måste 
rätta sig efter det. Många befarar att detta är inledningen på ett nytt ”stålbad” av 
nedläggningar i försvaret.  
Paragraph 5  Redan i våras ställde Krigsvetenskapsakademien kärnfrågan: ”Kan vi försvara oss?”. 
Och nu svarar ÖB för första gången i klartext:  
Paragraph 6  – Vi kan försvara oss mot ett angrepp med ett begränsat mål. Vi talar om ungefär en 
vecka på egen hand.  
Paragraph 7  Om Sverige angrips från två håll, klarar vi det?  
Paragraph 8  – Nej, då klarar vi inte av det speciellt länge, så är fakta, svarar Sverker Göranson.  
Paragraph 9  ÖB förklarar att de militära hot man ser mot Sverige är av annat slag än kalla krigets 
stora invasioner. I dag gäller andra scenarier som Försvarsmakten prövat i hemliga spel. 
I dessa utsätts Sverige för begränsade militära våldshandlingar. En angripares syfte 
skulle då vara att under en internationell kris ställa Sverige inför fullbordat faktum. 
Detta genom att slå ut en storstad (exempelvis Stockholm) eller inta ett begränsat 
geografiskt område (en landsända eller Gotland).  
Paragraph 10 Vi klarar alltså ett begränsat angrepp i en vecka?  
Paragraph 11 – Ja, sedan är våra resurser nedkörda på sådant sätt att motståndskraften inte är så stor 
längre, svarar Sverker Göranson.  
Paragraph 12 En vecka in i striderna förväntar sig ÖB att Sverige får militär hjälp – men inte från EU 
där vi är medlemmar ”det är ingen militärallians”. I stället nämner han hur Sverige i en 
stabsövning ledd av Nato 2011 satte in större delen av sina Gripenplan för att undsätta 
Norge som angripits av övningsfienden. Han förväntar sig samma solidaritet om 
Sverige attackeras.  
Paragraph 13 – Jag ser det nordiska samarbetet i det perspektivet. Vi har inga avtal med dem på något 
sätt, vi är fortfarande militärt alliansfria.  
Paragraph 14 I Norden är tre av fem länder med i Nato, är det alltså Nato vi räknar med eller 
hoppas på?  
Paragraph 15 – Jag varken räknar med eller hoppas. Jag konstaterar att världen ser ut på ett visst sätt. 
Västvärlden kommer sannolikt också att vara engagerad i vad som händer oss. Jag kan 
inte se ett scenario med ett begränsat angrepp mot Sverige och att ingenting händer i 
omvärlden.  
Paragraph 16 Sverker Göransons besked innebär nya signaler som inte hörts på sjutton år. Inte sedan 
1995 då Owe Wiktorin var ÖB har det talats klarspråk om att försvaret inte klarar sina 
uppgifter utan hjälp utifrån. Wiktorins varning kom inför försvarsbeslutet 1996 då 
invasionsförsvaret lades ned.  
  
 
Paragraph 17 1996 var ju också det tidigare hotet, Sovjetimperiet, upplöst och ryska försvaret i fritt 
fall. I stället blev internationella insatser, som i Afghanistan, den nya huvuduppgiften 
för Försvarsmakten. Under näste ÖB, Johan Hederstedt, såg försvaret inga militära hot 
utan tog en ”strategisk timeout”. För tio år sedan tömdes alla mobiliseringsförråd, 
krigsbaser lades ner och all planering för försvar av Sveriges territorium upphörde.  
Paragraph 18 I dag är läget ett annat. Enligt Sverker Göranson, som blev ÖB i mars 2009, är en sak 
säker: ”Osäkerheten har ökat”.  
Paragraph 19 Pendeln började svänga tillbaka i augusti 2008 när Ryssland-Georgienkriget bröt ut. 
Det visade att gränser i Europa åter kan ändras med våld. Sedan dess har Ryssland 
under president Vladimir Putin antagit alltmer sovjetiska drag. Detta paras med en 
kraftfull rysk upprustning som svenska försvaret kan följa på nära håll.  
Paragraph 20 – Normalbilden har förändrats jämfört med för tio år sedan. Det övas betydligt mer från 
rysk sida i Östersjön och Norska havet. Det är allt större, allt mer komplexa övningar. 
De är på väg uppåt i kvalitet i sin försvarsmakt.  
Paragraph 21 Försvarsmakten har nu åter börjat planera för försvar av riket och 2013 återinförs fyra 
regionala staber. Men markförbanden som de ska kunna leda i Insatsorganisation 2014 
är inte fullt bemannade och övade förrän 2019. Det nya yrkesförsvaret är så slimmat att 
Riksrevisionen konstaterat att hälften av stridsflyget och många fartyg inte kunde sättas 
in 2012 eftersom personal fattades.  
Paragraph 22 I april gav ÖB regeringen besked om att försvarsbudgeten på i dag 41 miljarder per år 
inte räcker till från 2015. Dels kostar det ytterligare 1,5 miljarder kronor att anställa och 
öva hela Insatsorganisationen. Dels finns ett ”materielberg” med äldre utrustning för 25 
miljarder kronor som måste ersättas.  
Paragraph 23 Därefter har riksdagen beställt 40–60 nya Super-Jas vilket tränger undan planerad 
materiel för 5,5 miljarder kronor – vilket kan skapa nya luckor försvaret.  
Paragraph 24 Du sade i somras att utan mer pengar måste man lägga ner en försvarsgren, gäller 
det fortfarande?  
Paragraph 25 – Ja, svarar ÖB.  
Paragraph 26 De anslagna pengarna räcker alltså inte till för att driva det försvar som politikerna 
bestämt att Sverige ska ha. Därför fick ÖB genom ”regeringsbeslut 7” den 4 oktober 
uppdraget att föreslå nya effektiviseringar och nedskärningar. Om sitt svar som Sverker 
Göranson ska lämna den 1 mars säger han endast:  
Paragraph 27 – Det är en oerhört tuff uppgift.  
 
